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LAW AND LIBERATION asked members of its advisory
Is Law and Liberation an oxymoron?
The following are some of the answers we received ...
Owen Fiss
Which law? Whose Liberation?
Mari Matsuda




True anyhow no matter how may liars use those
words.
In his poem, "In Explanation of Our Times,"' Lang-
ston Hughes warned gleefully of the world's subordi-
nated people, addressed only as "George," "Sallie,"
"Coolie," or "Boy," ready to hear those words of free-
dom "and shout them back at the Misters, Lords,
Generals, Viceroys, Governors of South Carolina." What
joy it would give our brother Langston to see the chil-
dren of George and Sallie, grown up and gone to Yale,
launching a Journal to shout back those freedom words.
The word magician knew that the language of de-
mocracy in the hands of the oppressed was a revolution-
ary thing. Another Hughes poem quotes Thomas Jeffer-
son on equality, and remembers the slaves who silently
presumed "what he said was also meant for them." In
that poem, "Freedom's Plow," 2 the writer tells the
reader we own those words of freedom, and his broad
inclusive "we," as his poems make clear, really means
we.
The ideals of Equality, Rights, Democratic Process,
and Constitutionalism, are not enough alone. They are
good ideals, some of the best that human beings have
derived for living peaceful lives. In combination with a
heart and hand tied to communities of the subordinated,
those ideals take on liberating power.
The law that is so often manipulated to advance the
privileges of a few is not a necessary result of commit-
ment to the rule of law. It is, however, the result when
rule-of-law conversations go on divorced from the experi-
ence and the participation of poor and working people,
women, gays and lesbians, native peoples, and people of
color. The question is not can law promote liberation.
Rather, the question is whose law. When legal doctrine
and legal institutions are in the hands of Langston's chil-
dren, the "black brown yellow bent down working" 3 folk,
law and liberation will be one. May the words in this
Journal bring us closer to the day.
I. L. Hughes, "In Explanation of Our Times," Selected
Poems of Langston Hughes, at 281 (1974).
2. L. Hughes, "Freedom's Plow," Selected Poems of Lang-
ston Hughes, at 291 (1974).
3. Id.
board to respond to the question:
Lucinda Finley
My first instinct is to answer a facile "yes" to your
question. After all, the juxtaposition of the words "law"
and "liberation" seems jarringly incongruous. Resort to
law means resort to the power and definitions of the
state, yet it is this power and these categorizations that
people seeking liberation most often wish to resist or
overcome. "Law" is synonymous with "rule," "order,"
"consistency," "continuity." "Liberation" implies over-
turning or breaking out from existing rules, confounding
the existing order, smashing consistency and disrupting
authority.
But this does not mean that people seeking liberation
can ignore or dispense with law. Law is going to affect
liberation struggles whether those seeking liberation en-
gage with it or not. So, to me, a far more difficult and
interesting question, implied by the one you pose, is
"Can law ever be used as a positive tool for liberation?"
Certainly civil rights activists, who looked to courts to
support their rights to march and sit in, and to vindicate
Black peoples' claims to equal human dignity and citi-
zenship, thought that law could be a positive partner of
progressive political action. And women's rights activists,
who have been even more legalistic in their activities, ap-
parently are committed to a positive role for law in their
struggle for liberation.
But these groups have had to confront the fact that
law in this country has been shaped and given meaning
largely by white men - men who were also economi-
cally privileged. So, law's doctrines and categories and
ways of understanding social problems are too often deaf
and blind to the experiences, values, and needs of dis-
empowered, marginalized people. In order to make the
law a useful ally in struggles for liberation, we must
work not only to diversify its practitioners, but also to
diversify its definitions and ways of reasoning and un-
derstanding society. We must work to make the law not
"color-blind" (definition: that which sees only white) or
"gender-neutral" (definition: the more like a man you
are the more neutral you are), but instead wide-eyed in
its comprehension of the historical and social and eco-
nomic significance of race, class, gender, sexual orienta-
tion, power, and domination in this society. The perspec-
tives of those previously excluded from the powered side
of the law must be incorporated into the way the law
defines problems. In the process, the range of solutions
the law can envision will be enlarged. When those seek-
ing liberation can look at the law and say it is not just a
system that respects whatever is closest to white men's
standards, but is the law(s) of many people, then law
can be a more positive tool for liberation. But if that day
ever comes, we might not call it law, and we might find
that we've already been liberated.
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Law and Liberation
Guido Calabresi
Law can oppress; law can liberate. Reactionaries,
rulers, reformers, radicals, and revolutionaries: some of
the most famous of each have been trained in law and
have used law to further their ends. Lincoln, Ghandi,
Lenin, and Jesus Christ all studied law and knew full
well the value of a powerful legal argument.
In a dictatorship the most formal and legalistic of ar-
guments can help conserve the freedoms of an earlier
age that the present tyranny seeks to destroy. During
fascism in Italy, those scholars, lawyers, and judges who
sought to protect 19th century "liberal" rights from to-
talitarian oppression found their strongest refuge (and
considerable success) through a narrow parsing of the
Codes. In a progressive society a functional use of law
can be an extraordinarily powerful weapon in achieving
freedom for the people. But law can work the other way,
too.
Those who hail law or decry it in itself, mistake the
tool for the artisan. The artisans of the JOURNAL OF
LAW AND LIBERATION have a powerful tool in their
hands. I wish them well in their use of it.
Pat Williams
I. LAW
I sit with my sister at my parent's kitchen table.
Grown now, she and I are at home for Christmas holi-
day. We are chatting, catching up on each other's lives.
My sister is telling me about how her house is haunted
by rabbits. I am telling her about how I'm trying to
write a book on law and liberation.
"The previous owner had hundreds of them," she
says. "You can hear them dancing in the dining room
after midnight."
"Mine will be a book about the jurisprudence of
rights," I respond. "I will attempt to apply so-called crit-
ical thought to legal studies. I believe that critical theory
has vital insights to contribute to debates about the eth-
ics of law and the meaning of rights; yet many of those
insights have been buried heretofore in relatively arcane
vocabulary and abstraction. I will try to write in a way,
therefore, that will bridge the traditional gap between
theory and practice. It is not my goal merely to simplify;
I hope that the result is a text that is multi-layered -
that encompasses the straightforwardness of real life and
that reveals complexity of meaning."
"But what's the book about," my sister asks at this
point, thumping her leg against the chair impatiently.
"Howard Beach, polar bears and food stamps," I
snap back. "I am interested in the way in which legal
language flattens and confines in absolutes the complex-
ity of meaning inherent in any given problem; thus I will
try to challenge the usual limits of commercial discourse
by using an intentionally double-voiced and relational,
rather than a traditionally legal black-letter vocabulary.
For example, I have been a commercial lawyer and a
teacher of contract and property law. I am also black
and female, a status which one of my former employers
described as being 'at oxymoronic odds' with that of
commercial lawyer. While I certainly took issue with
that particular characterization, it is true that my at-
tempts to write in my own voice have placed me in the
center of a snarl of social tensions and crossed bounda-
ries. On the one hand, my writing has been staked out as
the exclusive interdisciplinary property of constitutional
law, contract, black history, jurisprudence, political sci-
ence and rhetoric. At the same time, my work has been
described, at various points, as a 'sophisticated frontal
assault' on laissez faire's most sacred sanctums, as 'new
age performance art,' and as 'anecdotal individualism.'
In other words, to speak as black, female and commer-
cial lawyer has rendered me simultaneously universal,
trendy and marginal. I think, moreover, that there is a
paradigm at work , in the persistent perceptions of me as
inherent contradiction: a paradigm of larger social per-
ceptions that divide public from private, black from
white, dispossessed from legitimate. This realization,
while extremely personal, inevitably informs my writing
on a professional level."
"What's so new," asks my sister, losing interest rap-
idly, "about a schizophrenic black lady pouring her
heart out about food stamps and polar bears?" I lean
closer to her: "Floating signifiers," I whisper.
I continue: "Legal writing presumes a methodology
that is highly stylized, precedential, and based on deduc-
tive reasoning. Most scholarship in law is rather like the
"old math:" static, stable, formal - rationalism walled
against chaos. My writing is an intentional departure
from that. I have tried to employ a model of inductive
empiricism, borrowed from systems analysis, in order to
enliven thought about complex, dynamic social
problems. My goal is to look at legal issues within a
framework described not just by the four corners of a
document - be it contract or the Constitution - but by
the disciplines of psychology, sociology, history, criticism
and philosophy. The advantage of this approach is that it
highlights factors that otherwise would go unremarked.
For example, stare decisis, rather than remaining a si-
lent, unquestioned "given," can be analyzed as a filter to
certain types of systematic input. Another advantage is
that this sort of analytic technique can serve to describe
a community of context for those social actors whose
traditional legal status has been the isolation of oxymo-
ron, of oddity, or of outsider. I am trying to create a
genre of legal writing to fill the gaps of traditional legal
scholarship. I would like to write in a way that reveals
the intersubjectivity of legal constructions, that forces
the reader both to participate in the construction of
meaning and to be conscious of that process. Thus, in
attempting to fill the gaps in the discourse of commer-
cial exchange, I hope that the gaps in my own writing
will be self-consciously filled by the reader, as an act of
forced mirroring of meaning-invention. To this end, I ex-
ploit all sorts of literary devices, including parody, para-
ble, and poetry."
"... as in polar bears?" my sister asks eagerly, alert
now, ears pricked, nose quivering, hair bristling. "My
what big teeth you have!" I exclaim, just before the
darkness closes over me ...
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II. LIBERATION
It is my deep belief that law and liberation are not
oxymoronic. It is, I think, the goal and political aspira-
tion of this journal to fill in the gaps between those apos-
tatized ends that the sensation of oxymoron marks.
What I hope will be filled in, in this collective enterprise,
is connection; connection between our psyche and our
readers, between lived experience and social perception,
and between an encompassing theory of history and a
jurisprudence of generosity.
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